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In the present paper we examine whether financial markets could have helped 
predict exchange rates in three selected Central and Eastern European (CEE) 
economies of the EU, namely the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, during the 
current financial crisis. To this end, we derive risk-neutral densities from the 
implied volatilities of FX options, which approximate market expectations about 
exchange rate developments. Based on these risk-neutral density estimates, we then 
assess the out-of-sample predictive power of indicators. The forecasting results 
suggest that models based on FX options are inferior to the random walk in terms of 
the forecasting error, confirming a stylized fact about the short-term forecasting of 
exchange rates. Yet, we also find that, for the Czech Republic and Poland, risk-
neutral densities contain useful information on the direction of change of the 
exchange rate. 
   
Keywords: Options, implied volatility, risk-neutral density, exchange rate 
forecasting, Bayesian model averaging, subprime crisis, emerging markets  
 
JEL: C11, C32, C53, F37, G14, G17 
 
Acknowledgements: 
The authors would like to thank Peter Backé, Martin Cincibuch, Markus Eller, 
Peter Mooslechner, Doris Ritzberger-Grünwald and two anonymous referees for 
their helpful hints and comments. Adam Geršl acknowledges the support by the 
Grant Agency of the Czech Republic (GACR 403/10/1235) and by the Czech 
Ministry of Education (Grant MSMT 0021620841). The findings, interpretations and 
conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors and do not 


















The current financial and economic crisis has had a rather unexpected impact on the 
foreign exchange markets in Central and Eastern European (CEE) non-euro area 
countries with flexible exchange rate regimes. This study focuses on the Czech 
Republic, Hungary and Poland (in the following referred to as CEE-3), whose 
currencies – the forint, the Czech koruna and the złoty – appreciated heavily vis-à-vis 
the euro during the first phase of the global credit crunch, i.e. between the summer of 
2007 and the fall of the U.S. investment bank Lehman Brothers in September 2008. 
This was quite surprising given that already in this first phase of the global credit 
crisis, financial markets were severely hit by widespread distrust and reduced risk 
appetite. In the subsequent period until early March 2009, the negative liquidity shock 
affecting financial markets following the Lehman Brothers collapse impacted 
dramatically on investors’ perceptions. Suddenly market attention shifted to the 
external positions of the CEE-3 and the deteriorating real economy. As a 
consequence, the forint, Czech koruna and złoty came under heavy pressure. In 
March 2009, market sentiment turned around and the CEE-3 currencies have since 
recovered significantly. 
 
Were these exchange rate developments and summersaults that unexpected or 
could they – to some extent – have been predicted? Despite the seminal paper by 
Meese and Rogoff (1983), which shows that in the short run the predictive quality of 
the random walk model is superior to that of the most relevant economic models for 
the exchange rate, various approaches have emerged in the literature that have tried 
to challenge this stylized fact. For the very short run, one approach suggests using 
the volatility implied by FX options, which, according to some authors, contains 
information on future exchange rate developments as it reflects market sentiment and 
beliefs.
1 The use of such a market-based indicator is in line with Crespo Cuaresma 
and Slačík (2009), who review standard early warning indicators for currency crises 
in the framework of model uncertainty and conclude that indicators which mirror 
market sentiment (unlike fundamental variables) have some predictive power with 
respect to recent dramatic exchange rate moves. 
 
                                                            
1 See e.g. Cincibuch and Bouc (2004) for a discussion.   2
The objective of the present paper is to explore whether the implied volatility of FX 
options vis-à-vis the euro in the CEE-3 contains information on future exchange rates 
and, hence, whether such information could have been used to predict the exchange 
rate during the crisis. Since information on market sentiment and beliefs can be 
expressed in terms of the probability distribution over the expected exchange rate, 
we employ a method developed by Malz (1997) to extract an estimate of such a 
density from observed option prices at each point in time. 
 
From the densities obtained we compute various statistics, such as the moments or 
the probability of a depreciation/appreciation exceeding a certain threshold. In the 
next step, we assess the out-of-sample forecasting ability of these density-based 
statistics along with other financial market variables, such as stock indices or short- 
and long-term interest rates within the framework of vector autoregressive (VAR) 
models. The fact that there is no finite, well-specified set of explanatory variables 
(and lags thereof) to be included in the VAR model gives rise to a serious problem of 
model uncertainty. We address this issue by employing Bayesian model averaging 
techniques. Besides the model averaged forecasts, we present predictions of the 
“best” model in the Bayesian sense, i.e. the model with the highest posterior 
probability, and predictions based on simple bivariate models including the exchange 
rate and a constructed financial sentiment indicator. 
 
Our results are mixed. On the one hand, they indicate that none of the models 
employed improves forecasts over the random walk model in terms of the root mean 
square forecasting error. This outcome thus confirms the above-mentioned stylized 
fact about the short-term forecasting of exchange rates made well known by the 
contribution of Meese and Rogoff (1983). On the other hand, risk-neutral densities 
seem to provide some information on the direction of change of the exchange rate, 
particularly in the case of the Czech Republic. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. In the next descriptive section, we analyze 
exchange rate developments in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland since 
these countries’ EU entry, with a particular focus on the current financial crisis. 
Section 3 explains the method we used to extract risk-neutral probability distributions 
from quoted option prices and describes the data as well as some basic features of 
FX option markets in the CEE-3. In section 4, we shed some light on how we address 
the problem of model uncertainty and conduct the forecasting exercise. Section 5 
concludes. 
 
2 Exchange Rates of the CEE-3 Currencies during the Crisis – A Puzzle 
 
The evolution of exchange rates in the CEE-3 during the global financial crisis 
between 2007 and 2009 has been sort of a puzzle.
2 The three subpanels of chart 1 
depict the development of the forint, Czech koruna and złoty (the blue line in each 
subpanel) against the development of the one-month at-the-money (ATM)
3 implied 
volatility (magenta line) in the period from 2004 to June 2009. In terms of the 
exchange rate development, the whole period can be tentatively divided into four 





2004 until the outbreak of the global credit crisis in summer 2007, was marked by 
trend appreciation due to productivity increases as well as prevailing risk appetite. 
The only exception to the appreciation trend is Hungary, with a more volatile 
exchange rate, which was at least in part associated with high fiscal deficits during 
this period: After consolidation had finally started in 2006, it weighed on the country’s 
growth performance.  
 
A second period can be recognized between the beginning of the crisis in spring 
2007 and the fall of the U.S. investment bank Lehman Brothers in September 2008. 
During this time the appreciation trend sped up in the Czech Republic and Poland 
and the forint started to appreciate heavily vis-à-vis the euro area.
. In light of the 
widespread distrust and reduced risk appetite, which characterized financial markets 
at that time, this development may seem surprising. Two main causes are cited as an 
explanation for this development: the unwinding of carry trades and the “safe haven” 
hypothesis.  
 
The very low short-term interest rates on the CEE-3 currencies, especially the Czech 
koruna, predestined them as financing currencies for carry trades. As the risk 
appetite diminished in markets when the U.S. subprime problems hit a number of 
global financial institutions via structured instruments, these institutions started to 
unwind carry trades given their nature as a risky and speculative investment strategy. 
Evidence for the Czech koruna, as described in the Financial Stability Review 2007 
of Česká národní banka (ČNB, 2008), suggests that this development might have 
been important in the first two or three months after the beginning of the global crisis, 
but can hardly explain the appreciation trend over a longer horizon. 
 
The “safe haven” hypothesis (see ČNB, 2009) is a more comprehensive, albeit also 
questionable, explanation of the appreciation of the CEE-3 currencies in the crisis 
period. This hypothesis is based on the observed fact that the global financial crisis 
first spread only across advanced countries, where banks were holding toxic assets 
linked to subprime mortgages. In contrast, emerging countries in Europe were not 
directly hit, as banks in the region – many of them foreign owned – concentrated on 
more traditional banking activities, such as deposit collection and lending, given the 
yet unsaturated markets in these countries. The direct holding of subprime securities 
was negligible in the CEE-3 banking sectors, which led many market participants to 
believe that, instead of the U.S. dollar or Western European currencies, the CEE-3 
currencies would take on the role of a safe haven. Investors shed assets 
denominated in U.S. dollar or euro and started investing in CEE-3 assets. 
 


















Development of exchange rates and 1M ATM implied volatilities 
Chart 1








































We can discern a third period starting with the Lehman Brothers collapse in mid-
September 2008 and lasting until early March 2009. The liquidity shock in global   5
financial markets caused by Lehman’s fall led investors to focus on the dependence 
of CEE economies on external funding. Suddenly, the negative external positions of 
the banking sector of some economies in this region, such as Hungary and the Baltic 
countries – which international investors had up to then considered to be within an 
acceptable range – played an important role in increasing risk aversion toward the 
CEE region as a whole. In chart 1, this abrupt change in market sentiment is pictured 
by the magenta line, which clearly portrays the unprecedented rise of the implied 
volatility in the CEE-3 during this period of increased uncertainty. Given the liquidity 
shock triggered by the Lehman failure, it was feared that these countries would not 
be able to roll over their external (mainly short-term) debt. Moreover, real economic 
developments in the CEE-3 started to give signs of weakness, driven by these 
countries’ dependence on the macroeconomic development in the euro area, which 
deteriorated significantly as a consequence of the financial crisis. The depreciation 
pressures that emerged also put the extent of FX lending in most CEE countries into 
the spotlight, except for the Czech Republic where FX lending has been less 
pronounced. Fears that depreciation would further increase the problems of the 
indebted private sector, already hit by the lack of external demand, accelerated the 
depreciating path, especially in the first two months of 2009. 
 
While all CEE economies were hit by the increased risk aversion toward the region, 
the three economies analyzed presented different characteristics in this respect. The 
risk aversion drivers mentioned above were mostly valid only for Hungary, given its 
large external funding needs, widespread FX lending and particularly high 
dependence on external demand. When the domestic bond market dried up 
completely in early October 2008, Hungarian authorities asked for IMF assistance. In 
contrast, the Czech Republic launched a strong communication campaign 
emphasizing the positive external position of its banking sector
4 (thus implying 
virtually no need for external funding) and the absence of FX lending to households 
(and relatively low FX lending levels vis-à-vis the corporate sector). Given the high 
openness of the Czech economy and the important role of the manufacturing sector, 
the impact on the real economy was nevertheless large. Poland – also due to its size 
– was less dependent on external demand and is one of the few countries where the 
impact of the crisis on domestic economic activity was relatively subdued. 
  
Finally, a fourth period starting in March 2009 is characterized by a certain recovery 
of the CEE-3 currencies from the low levels recorded in February/March 2009. When 
global financial markets stabilized and IFI/EU assistance to some CEE countries in 
need was stepped up, CEE countries experienced a slow return of optimism in the 
financial markets – mainly stock but also exchange rate markets – patently 
documented for the CEE-3 in chart 1 by the gradual decline of both the exchange 
rate and the implied volatility. 
 
3 Would Markets Have Been Able to Predict the Exchange Rate Path? 
 
Against this backdrop, we raise the question whether financial markets were caught 
by surprise by the exchange rate path described above. Put differently, we wonder 
                                                            
4 At the end of 2008, the Czech banking system had a positive external position of around 6% of GDP, 
mainly due to a very high deposit-to-loan ratio (130%). The Polish banking system had a negative 
external position of –7% of GDP (with a deposit-to-loan ratio of 92%), and the Hungarian banking 
system’s external position was negative as well, at –18% of GDP (with a deposit-to-loan ratio of only 
71%). For a comparison with other EU countries, see ČNB (2009, pp. 49–50).   6
whether markets could have had some predictive power with respect to the future 
exchange rate even though Meese and Rogoff (1983) showed that in the short run 
exchange rates follow the random walk. Crespo Cuaresma and Slačík (2009), who 
review standard early warning indicators for currency crises under the aspect of 
model uncertainty, conclude that only indicators which mirror the market sentiment 
(unlike fundamental variables) have some predictive power with respect to recent 
dramatic exchange rate moves. In the same vein, several studies
5 have shown that 
the implied volatility of FX options, which reflects market sentiment and beliefs, 
contains information on future exchange rate performance. 
 
Using these findings, we hence proceed to explore whether observed FX option 
prices provide some information not yet incorporated into the price of the underlying 
spot exchange rate. Since information on market beliefs can be neatly expressed in 
terms of a probability distribution, the task is to estimate the density function based 
on FX options in order to draw inference on it and test its predictive ability. 
 
3.1 Extracting Risk-Neutral Density from Option Prices 
 
A European option provides the holder with the right (not obligation) to buy (in the 
case of a call option) or sell (put option) an asset on a certain expiration date at a 
certain price, the so-called strike or exercise price. At maturity T , a European call 
option with a strike price  X  thus yields either the difference between the spot asset 
price ( T S ) and the strike price if the option is exercised, or 0 otherwise. The price 
) , , ( T X t c  of a European call option at time t thus corresponds to the discounted 
value of the option's expected payoff at T : 
  
,0)] ( max [ = ) , , , , ( X S E e r T X t S c T
r
t 
   
              
T T T X
r dS S X S e ) ( ) ( = 
  
 
   (1) 
 
where  t T     is the time to maturity, r  stands for the appropriate risk-free domestic 
interest rate and  (.)   denotes the risk-neutral probability density function (RND) of 
the asset price  T S . 
 
To extract the RND from a European call option price, we can use the result derived 
by Breeden and Litzenberger (1978), according to which the RND is proportional to 
the second derivative of the call price with respect to the strike price: 
 
2
2 ) , , (
= ) (
X
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Option prices, determined by the demand-supply relationship in the market, are 
typically transformed to the implied volatility in units called vols that are used to quote 
option "prices." Hence, option prices expressed in currency units are not directly 
observable and the derivative of the call price cannot be obtained in a straightforward 
manner. For this transformation, practitioners employ the extension of the Black-
                                                            
5 See e.g. Cincibuch and Bouc (2004) for a discussion.   7
Scholes formula
6 to FX options by Garman and Kohlhagen (1983), according to 
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where  r  and 
 r represent the domestic and foreign risk-free domestic interest rate, 
(.)   is the standard cumulative normal distribution function and   the volatility 
parameter. Hence, according to the Black-Scholes model, there is one-to-one 
mapping between the option price and the volatility parameter or, in other words, 
each option price determined in the market implies a unique volatility parameter  . 
Therefore, in order to derive the RND, we first transform observed data on implied 
volatilities at time t into option prices as a function of the strike price. 
 
First of all, we need to define the concept of moneyness. An option is said to be at 
the money if the strike price equals the price of the underlying asset. In contrast, a 
call (put) option is in the money if  X St >  ( X St < ) or out of the money if  X St <  
( X St > ). However, rather than in terms of the spot and the strike price the 
moneyness of an option is usually expressed by the option's delta. Delta is defined 
as the rate of change (first derivative) of the Black-Scholes option price with respect 
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Delta is thus a measure for the extent to which an option is exposed to changes in 
the price of the underlying asset and ranges between 0 and 1 in absolute value terms 
(negative for puts and positive for calls). An at-the-money option has a delta of 
approximately 0.5 in absolute value. The more an option is in the money, the closer 
its delta to 1; the more it is out of the money, the smaller its delta (in absolute values). 
 
Although the Black-Scholes model assumes that irrespective of moneyness or time to 
maturity all options on the same currency have an identical implied volatility, in 
practice it is often observed that out-of-the money options have higher implied 
volatilities than at-the-money options. This phenomenon, often referred to as the 
volatility smile, suggests that the distribution of exchange rates has fatter tails (i.e. 
higher kurtosis) than the normal distribution. 
 
                                                            
6 While the Black-Scholes model, developed by Black and Scholes (1973) for pricing stock options, 
has facilitated the exponential growth of derivatives and is widely used, it is certainly not undisputed as 
it is based on several simplifying (arguably simplistic) assumptions. For example, one of the 
shortcomings of the Black-Scholes model is the mixing of discrete-in-time and continuous-in-price 
space. Problematic is also the fact that the model abstracts from important market elements (e.g. the 
role of liquidity) or real market features, particularly volatility smiles. (See below a brief discussion on 
the latter and e.g. Chorafas 2008 for a detailed discussion on the shortcomings of the Black-Scholes 
model).   8
Against this backdrop, in the first step we need to construct a continuous volatility 
smile from observable data. We do this in the spirit of Malz (1997) by interpolating at 
each point in time a particular functional form through the prices of three commonly 
traded option products: (1) At-the-money forwards, for which the strike price 
corresponds to the forward price, (2) risk reversals and (3) strangles. The latter two 
are different combinations of out-of-the money call and put options. The interpolation 
function proposed by Malz is linear in the at-the-money volatility, the risk reversal 
price and the deviation of delta from 0.5, and quadratic in the strangle price and the 
deviation of delta from 0.5. Hence, we obtain a functional form for the volatility as a 
function of delta ( ) ( t ), which can be interpreted as a Taylor approximation to  ) ( t  
at  0.5 =  .
7 
 
As we eventually want to estimate the RND by second-differentiating equation (3) 
with respect to the strike price in accordance with equation (2), the thus far derived 
volatility smile in the delta-volatility space has to be translated in the next step into 
the strike price-volatility space. This can be easily done by substituting delta with the 
derivative of the Black-Scholes formula with respect to the strike price in the 
interpolated volatility smile function, so that we get  ) ( = )) , , , , , ( ( X r r X S t t t     

. 
Unfortunately, as this function cannot be inverted, we cannot solve for  X  analytically. 
However, we can use an iterative grid search procedure to find for each value of   
the corresponding value of  X . We thus transform the interpolated volatility smile in 
the delta-sigma space into a continuous function in the strike price-volatility space. 
 
For the sake of illustration, the two panels of chart 2 show – for Hungary – the 
volatility smile for the option combination described above in the delta-sigma space 
and in the strike price-sigma space at three different points in time: 
(1) On a representative day in tranquil times prior to the outbreak of the crisis, 
(2) on the day of the Lehman Brothers collapse and 
(3) on the day when the forint reached the trough vis-à-vis the euro. 
 
The message to be taken out of chart 2 is twofold. On the one hand, it is evident that 
the implied volatility is higher in the out-of-the-money area (lower delta and higher 
strike price) of the combined option product. On the other hand, on the day of the fall 
of Lehman Brothers the implied volatility of a particular delta/strike price did not rise 
significantly, but at the peak of the crisis, it was several times higher than in normal 
times. 
 
Chart 2: Example of Volatility Smile: Hungary 
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Substituting in the next step the strike price-volatility combinations derived through 
the grid search into equation (3), we obtain a continuum of expressions for 
fx
t c . The 
(numerical) second differentiation of the latter multiplied by 
 r e  in accordance with 
equation (2) yields the risk-neutral probability density function. We can summarize 
the characteristics of the RND, using moments or other statistics derived from the 
estimated distributions. In our case, we calculate the standard deviation, skewness, 
kurtosis as well as the probability that the exchange rate will appreciate/depreciate by 
3% or more, which we use in the forecasting exercise below. 
 
3.2 Data and Some Basic Features of FX Option Markets in the CEE-3 
 
For the analysis in this paper, we use data on FX options for all of the CEE-3 
currencies. The FX markets in the CEE-3 are structured as typical over-the-counter 
(OTC) markets, where most transactions take place in the interbank market, often 
with nonresident (London-based) banks or even between nonresident banks. Given 
the high relevance of the euro, euro options dominate the market.
8 Among 
nonfinancial institutions, export-oriented companies very often use option markets 
(via local banks) to hedge their FX risk. Their demand triggers further contracts as 
local banks hedge their option positions immediately with nonresident banks, usually 
their parent banks (ČNB, 2009). 
 
Given the OTC nature of the FX option market and the fact that a number of FX 
option contracts are closed between nonresident institutions, it is difficult to get 
comparable and timely data on the size and liquidity of this market. One of the most 
reliable sources of comparable data is the Triennial Central Bank Survey of Foreign 




recent run was organized in April 2007. According to these data, of the CEE-3 
currencies, the Polish złoty records the biggest FX option market in absolute terms, 
with an estimated daily average volume of USD  940 million. This contrasts with 
USD 269 million for the Hungarian forint option market and USD 226 million for the 
Czech koruna option market.
9 By way of comparison, the average daily turnover in 
the Swedish krona option market was USD 2,885 million. 
 
The data are sourced from UBS and the exchange rate is quoted as domestic 
currency per euro. Given that UBS is not present locally in the CEE-3 countries and 
serves as a typical nonresident counterparty in the option market, the data are 
representative of both the local (local interbank) and the nonresident (global 
interbank) market. 
 
For our computations we use daily FX option data from the Czech Republic, Hungary 
and Poland for the period from April 1, 2003, to July 10, 2009. We make use of 
quoted one-month 25 delta put and 25 delta call option implied volatilities as well as 
one-month ATM implied volatility. The reference exchange rate is domestic currency 
against the euro. As mentioned above, broader coverage of different delta put and 
call options would be preferable for estimating risk-neutral density, but such data are 
not available for all currencies and all times. Therefore, we transformed quoted 
implied volatilities into implied volatilities of risk reversal (25 delta call minus 25 delta 
put) and strangle (average of implied volatilities of 25 delta put and 25 delta call 
options minus ATM volatility) contracts. 
 
The Malz (1997) method described above produces a risk-neutral density for each 
day for which option prices are available. Chart 3 illustrates RNDs for all three 
analyzed currencies on three specific dates during the crisis period: 
  (1) The peak (strongest value of the respective currency) in the safe haven 
period (July 2008), 
  (2) the Lehman Brothers fall on September 15, 2008, and 
  (3) the day on which the respective currencies were weakest vis-à-vis the euro 
in the risk aversion period (February or early March 2009). 
 
Chart 3 shows that after the fall of Lehman Brothers a systematic move toward a 
weaker exchange rate took place (the mean of the distribution moved to the right in 
all three cases), but the uncertainty surrounding the average expected level 
increased only slightly (the bell shape is only slightly squeezed compared with the 
one before the crisis). In contrast, at the peak of the risk aversion period the 
currencies were expected to stay at a depreciated level and also the uncertainty was 
substantially higher.  
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4 Out-of-Sample Properties of Risk-Neutral Densities 
 
4.1 Evaluating the Out-of-Sample Predictive Ability 
 
In this section, we assess the out-of-sample forecasting ability of exchange rate 
models containing statistics based on the estimated densities described in the 
previous sections. We limit ourselves to the evaluation of the predictive power within 








   (5)
  
where Yt is a k-dimensional vector composed by the change in the (log) exchange 
rate and k–1 other variables, which are assumed to potentially contain information 
about future developments of the exchange rate. The vector of intercept terms is 
given by A0,  Aj , for j=1 … p, which are assumed to be k×k matrices, and  t   is a 
multivariate Gaussian error term with zero mean and a variance-covariance matrix 
. In principle, several statistics obtained from the risk-neutral densities, as well as 
other explanatory variables, could be included in the VAR model given by (5), which 
gives rise to the extra problem of model uncertainty. Table 1 presents the variables 
we consider potential elements of the vector Yt in our study. They include statistics 
from the estimated densities as well as other financial market variables, such as 
stock indices and short- and long-term interest rates. 
 
The first issue is how to choose the set of variables which should be included in the 
forecasting model. We approach this issue of model uncertainty by using Bayesian 
model averaging techniques.
10 In concrete terms, the method we apply is an example 
of Bayesian Averaging of Classical Estimates (BACE) as presented by Sala-i-Martin, 
Doppelhofer and Miller (2004) and used in the framework of forecasting with VAR 
models by Crespo Cuaresma (2007). The intuition is to form weighted averaged 
predictions from all possible specifications in the model space. The weights are 
proportional to the explanatory power of the respective models for the exchange rate, 
once the inclusion of a large number of parameters was penalized. We build the 
weights, using the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) (Schwarz 1978),
11 whose use 
has been put forward in the literature as an instrument to obtain approximation of 
posterior model probabilities in the framework of Bayesian model averaging (Raftery, 
1995, and Clyde, 2000). 
 
Building weights for the predictions computed from the individual models presents an 
extra complication, which emanates from the large number of models in the space of 
possible specifications. Fixing the exchange rate as a variable in the vector Yt and 
assuming that there are K potential variables to form VAR models such as (5) implies 
that there are p2
K possible models to evaluate. For large values of K and if we allow 
for specifications with long lag lengths, this figure becomes intractable. Markov Chain 
Monte Carlo Model Composite (MC
3) methods have been proposed in the literature 
to deal with such large model spaces (Madigan and York, 1995). In our application, 
                                                            
10 See Doppelhofer (2008) for a survey on the issue. 
11 See Raftery (1995) for a discussion on the use of the BIC in model averaging.    13
we make use of the MC
3 method to reduce the number of models that need to be 
evaluated. 
 
The prediction exercise is carried out as follows. We use daily data on the variables 
listed in table 1 for the period from April 1, 2003, to July 10, 2009, and divide them 
into an in-sample period (April 1, 2003, to July 31, 2007) and an out-of-sample period 
(August 1, 2007, to July 10, 2009). We compute model averaged forecasts by 
obtaining h-steps ahead forecasts from the models entertained and by expanding the 
in-sample period recursively. The model weights are obtained in each case by using 
the information criteria corresponding to the exchange rate equation in (5) and are 
interpreted as the posterior probability assigned to each particular specification. We 
also obtain the predictions of the single specification which has the highest posterior 
model probability, which we use as a benchmark for comparison. 
 
An important statistic that can be obtained within the model averaging framework is 
the posterior inclusion probability of a given variable, which is defined as the sum of 
the posterior probability of the models containing this covariate. This statistic can be 
interpreted as the probability that a variable belongs to the true model. Using the 
posterior inclusion probabilities, we also compute an early warning indicator, which 
we call the financial sentiment indicator (FSI). The FSI summarizes the dynamics of 
the variables which contain information about future changes in the exchange rate 








































D y P y y
FSI

   (6) 
where yjt is variable j, j=1, …, K, and 
j y   and P(yjt |D) are its standard deviation and 
posterior inclusion probability given data D, respectively. 
 
In addition to the model averaged forecasts and the predictions of the model with the 
highest posterior probability (= “best” model), we also obtain predictions based on 
simple bivariate models including the exchange rate and the FSI (= index model).
12 
We consider VAR models which include the exchange rate together with any subset 
of the variables in table 1, and up to five lags for all variables in the model. This 
implies that our model space is composed of around 41,000 models. We use Markov 
Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods to identify the most promising models in the 
model space. Starting with an estimated model Mj for a given in-sample period, we 
propose randomly, and then estimate, an alternative model from its neighborhood, 
defined as a model with one variable more or less and any number of lags. Let this 
model be denoted Mk. We move from Mj to this new model with a probability which is 
proportional to the exponent of the difference in the BIC for the exchange rate 
equation between Mj and Mk (see Raftery, 1995, or Clyde, 2000). This implies that we 
visit models which explain the data relatively well after accounting for the large 
number of parameters they include. Instead of computing and averaging predictions 
over the whole model space, we only average over the models visited by the chain. 
                                                            
12 Our depreciation and appreciation probabilities refer to a threshold of 3%. Results for a threshold of 
5% were also obtained, which were qualitatively similar to those using 3%. The results using the 5% 
threshold are available from the authors upon request. 
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This procedure is repeated a large number of times and the models visited are 
recorded. In particular, we obtain out-of-sample predictions from each visited model, 
which we average in order to compute model averaged forecasts. We also identify 
the single model with the strongest data support (the model with the lowest BIC, 
which can be interpreted in Bayesian model averaging as the model with the highest 
posterior probability) and compute predictions based on this “best” model. 
 
Table 1: Variables Used in the Forecasting Exercise 
 
Implied probability of an appreciation larger than 3% 
Implied probability of a depreciation larger than 3% 
Standard deviation of the risk-neutral density estimate 
Skewness of the risk-neutral density estimate 
Kurtosis of the risk-neutral density estimate 
Stock returns (domestic economy) 
S&P GSCI returns 
EMBI returns 
Stock returns (EUR) 
Change in short-term interest rate differential with the euro area 
Change in long-term interest rate differential with the euro area 
EUR/USD exchange rate returns 
Difference between implied appreciation and depreciation probabilities 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations, UBS. 
 
4.2 Out-of-Sample Forecasting Results 
 
The results for each country are presented in table 2. We report the root mean 
square prediction error (RMSE), defined as  , where st, t=1, 
…, N are the (log) exchange rate observations in the out-of-sample period (of size N) 
and   is the corresponding prediction of the model. And we also report the direction 
of change statistic (DOC), which measures the proportion of forecasts where the 
change in the exchange rate was correctly predicted. Since we use data on options 
with a maturity of one month, we compute the forecasts at a 22 days-ahead horizon, 
which is the natural predictive horizon of the computed risk-neutral densities. As a 
benchmark for comparisons, we also include the results corresponding to the random 
walk model, which predicts the exchange rate in 22 days to be equal to the exchange 
rate level today. The results indicate that none of the models entertained improves 
forecasts over the random walk model in terms of RMSE, which ties in with the 
above-mentioned stylized fact on the short-term forecasting of exchange rates 
(Meese and Rogoff, 1983). 
 




  RMSE DOC 
Averaged forecasts 2.994  0.561   15
Best model  3.009  0.563 
Index model  3.015  0.699 
Random walk  2.938  - 
Hungary 
  RMSE DOC 
Averaged forecasts 12.787  0.427 
Best model  18.005  0.419 
Index model  4.002  0.472 
Random walk  2.938  - 
Poland 
  RMSE DOC 
Averaged forecasts 4.604  0.528 
Best model  4.680  0.514 
Index model  4.139  0.465 
Random walk  2.938  - 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Note: The root mean square prediction error (RMSE) is the square root of the average forecasting 
error, while the direction of change statistic (DOC) measures the proportion of forecasts where the 
change in the exchange rate was correctly predicted. The benchmark DOC of the random walk model 
is assumed to be 0.5. 
 
In spite of the discouraging results based on RMSE, we found in our analysis of the 
CEE-3 that risk-neutral densities nevertheless seem to provide some useful 
information on the direction of change of the exchange rate. In particular, the results 
for the Czech Republic indicate very large improvements in the direction of change 
statistic for all possible prediction strategies (averaged forecasts, best model and 
bivariate model based on the artificial financial sentiment index). A slight 
improvement is also obtained in the case of Poland, albeit only marginally over the 
0.5 DOC statistic implied by the random walk model. 
 
In table 3 we identify the variables that are chosen by our MCMC search as the most 
robust in-sample determinants of the exchange rate. In our application, the method 
tends to visit only few models after the burn-in phase, which implies that there are 
single specifications that explain exchange rate dynamics in our samples much better 
than the rest. This manifests itself in the relatively small differences in the predictive 
ability between averaged results and those implied by the best model in table 2. The 
variables chosen in the best model, which systematically coincide with those 
receiving large weights in the averaging technique and in the construction of the FSI, 
include in all cases variables related to market sentiment as measured by the risk-
neutral densities. As the posterior model probability is concentrated in very few 
specifications, the FSI is practically an unweighted average of the indicators identified 
in table 3. 
 
Overall, our results thus suggest that in the Czech Republic and in Poland most of 
the available information has been incorporated into the currency price. Some 
additional information can, however, be extracted from the markets, which is relevant 
enough to somewhat improve the ability to forecast exchange rates in the CEE-3 
compared with naïve forecasting models. In Hungary, in contrast, option prices do not 
seem to contain information that would substantially help forecast exchange rate 
movements. Our analysis does not allow for any conclusions on whether these   16
differences stem from a different degree of market efficiency, the market structure 
and liquidity or the rather specific macroeconomic fundamentals and very volatile 
environment in Hungary. 
 
While our results, which attest to a rather limited predictive power of FX options, may 
to a large extent contrast with the findings in the existing literature (see e.g. 
Cincibuch and Bouc, 2004), it should be borne in mind that we tested the markets’ 
predictive power in a substantially different environment. For instance, the paper by 
Cincibuch and Bouc (2004) analyzes the predictive power of FX options prior to the 
currency crisis in the Czech Republic in 1997, which was preceded by massive 
structural problems and disequilibria. The outbreak of this “homemade” crisis of the 
first generation type was basically only a matter of time, endogenously determined by 
the markets themselves. The authors thus conclude that high option prices might 
have revealed speculators’ positioning before their attacking the Czech koruna. 
 
However, the current financial and economic crisis was imported to the countries 
under study from outside and had little in common with the idiosyncratic fundamental 
development. The CEE-3 were affected by the general decline in risk appetite 
traceable to a crisis triggered in mature economies. In this context, the current crisis 
is more of the second generation type, with the countries shifting from a sustainable 
to an unsustainable equilibrium as a consequence of an exogenous shock, a sun 
spot. Small wonder that such a sun spot was not anticipated by the markets. Hence, 
further research is certainly needed to identify the causes of these differences found 
across countries and time. 
 
Table 3: Components of the Financial Sentiment Index by Country 
 
Variable Czech  Republic  Hungary  Poland
Change in long-term interest rate differential with the euro 
area      
Change in short-term interest rate differential with the euro 
area   x  x 
Difference between implied appreciation and depreciation 
probabilities x  x  x 
EMBI returns       
EUR/USD exchange rate returns       
S&P GSCI returns       
Implied probability of a depreciation larger than 3%  x  x  x 
Implied probability of an appreciation larger than 3%  x  x  x 
Kurtosis of the risk-neutral density estimate  x  x  x 
Skewness of the risk-neutral density estimate    x   
Standard deviation of the risk-neutral density estimate  x  x  x 
Stock returns (domestic economy)       
Stock returns (EUR)          
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
5 Summary and Conclusions 
 
Given the rather unexpected and puzzling exchange rate development in some 
Central, Eastern and Southeastern European countries during the current financial   17
crisis, we examine whether financial markets could have helped predict exchange 
rate changes in this period. In particular, we derive from the implied volatilities of FX 
options risk-neutral densities, which approximate market perceptions and 
expectations of future exchange rate developments. We employ a method developed 
by Malz (1997), which is based on the Black-Scholes option pricing formula and 
which entails interpolating a particular functional form through the prices of commonly 
traded option products at each point in time. Based on the thus derived risk-neutral 
densities, we compute various indicators which are supposed to exploit all the 
information contained in the distribution and therefore precisely describe market 
expectations about the exchange rate. Besides the moments of the distribution, we 
also calculate the probability that the exchange rate will appreciate/depreciate by 3% 
or more. Subsequently, we test the predictive power of these indicators and other 
financial sector variables in a VAR framework. We control for the high level of model 
uncertainty by employing Bayesian model averaging techniques. 
 
We obtain mixed results on the predictive ability of market expectations as measured 
by the characteristics of the risk-neutral densities. Predictions based on models 
which include this information are inferior to those of the random walk in terms of the 
mean square forecasting error. Yet, risk-neutral densities seem to provide some 
useful information on the direction of change of the exchange rate for the Czech 
Republic and Poland. In contrast, option prices in Hungary do not seem to contain 
information on future exchange rate changes. In general, our results suggest a lower 
predictive power of FX options than the existing literature. Future research should 
thus focus on where the differences along the country and time dimensions come 
from, whether they have anything to do with different degrees of market efficiency 
and/or crisis generation and how the predictive power of financial markets changes in 
normal tranquil times. Our results indicate that the financial market information 
embodied in risk-neutral densities may contain interesting clues about exchange rate 
dynamics. RNDs may thus be a useful instrument for monetary authorities to learn 
about the expected exchange rate development. 
 
Further research may shed light on the reasons for the differing results for the group 
of countries under study in this contribution. In particular, enlarging the set of models 
used to predict the exchange rate (by potentially including nonlinear models and 
specifications that explicitly account for the high frequency of the data) could improve 
the ability of risk-neutral densities to forecast exchange rates. On the methodological 
side, linking countries in the framework of a Global VAR (GVAR) model should prove 
to be a fruitful path of further research. In this case, the uncertainty concerning the 
choice of the weight variable linking countries together in the GVAR may also be 
modeled using Bayesian methods, such as those recently proposed by Crespo 
Cuaresma and Feldkircher (2009) for spatially correlated data. A generalization in 
this direction of the method put forward in this contribution would allow us to gain 
useful insights into contagion processes during financial crises. The model space 
may also be enlarged by including univariate or multivariate nonlinear time series 
specifications (e.g. Markov switching, threshold models, smooth transition models, to 
name the most popular ones), which would shed light on parameter heterogeneity 
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